MIAMIBEACH

CITY OF MIAMI BEACH NOVEMBER 7, 2023 GENERAL ELECTION

CANVASSING BOARD MEETING AFTER-ACTION

October 16, 2023, at 10:00 a.m.
Miami-Dade County Elections Department
2700 NW 87th Avenue
Miami, FL 33172

Canvassing Board members

Raul Cuervo, County Judge Absent
Rafael E. Granado, City Clerk Present
Faroat Andasheva, Qualified Elector Absent

Substitute and Alternate Canvassing Board members

Christopher Green, Substitute County Judge Absent Regis Barbou, Alternate Qualified Elector Absent

Staff to Canvassing Board

Jean Olin, Esq., Outside Counsel Absent

1. Logic and Accuracy Test of the touch screen and optical scan voting systems to be used for Vote-by-Mail, early voting, and precinct ballots and automated independent audit system.

Action:

- a. On October 16, 2023, at approximately 10:00 a.m., the Miami-Dade County Supervisor of Elections had the tabulating equipment to be used in the City of Miami Beach General Election publicly tested to ascertain that equipment will correctly count the precinct and Vote-by-Mail ballots cast for all candidates, in all offices, in the Miami Beach General Election to be held on November 7, 2023.
- b. Public notice of the testing of the tabulating equipment, the automated independent audit system, and the Canvassing Board Schedule for the November 7, 2023 City of Miami Beach General Election was published in the City's webpage, as well as in the Miami Herald and El Nuevo Herald on October 1, 2023.
- c. Rafael E. Granado, City Clerk, as representative of the Canvassing Board, attended the public Logic and Accuracy Test, to:
 - Certify the accuracy of the test and witness the resetting and sealing of each device that passed to a pre-election state of readiness in such a manner as to secure its state of readiness until the opening of the polls.
 - 2. Witness the Miami-Dade Election staff test each scanner to be used by the automated independent audit system (AIA) as prescribed by Clear Ballot to ensure the scanners are operating properly.

3. Witness the Miami-Dade Elections Department test the tabulation accuracy of the AIA software by performing a logic and accuracy test on all scanners used for scanning ballots.

Note: On October 9, 2023, the Canvassing Board designated Rafael E. Granado, City Clerk, to be its representative at the Logic and Accuracy Test.

- d. The Logic and Accuracy Test was open to the public, political party representatives, and candidates or their representatives.
 - On September 15, 2023, the City Clerk sent via certified mail written notice of the Canvassing Board schedule, which included the Logic and Accuracy Test date, time, and location, to the County party chair of each political party.
 - ii. During the qualifying period, the City Clerk provided each candidate with written notice of the Canvassing Board schedule, which included the Logic and Accuracy Test date, time, and location. Each candidate acknowledged receipt of the Schedule by signing and returning to the City Clerk a copy of the Schedule.
- e. Rafael E. Granado observed the performance and results of all required tests and verified the correctness of the programs and equipment, as well as any replacement of said materials required by said tests, subject to said tests. The Logic and Accuracy Test consisted of producing/processing a set of pre-determined valid votes for each candidate, as well as one or more under-voted and over-voted ballots for each contest.
- f. Upon satisfactorily completing the Logic and Accuracy Test, Rafael E. Granado compared the test results with the predetermined totals for each candidate according to the requirements established in Section 101.5612, Florida Statutes, observed the performance and results of all required tests and verified the correctness of the programs and equipment. The expected vote counts matched the actual vote counts.
- g. After the test, it was delivered to Rafael E. Granado, in a sealed container with seal No. 0052763, the verified Logic and Accuracy Test reports and test materials. Steps have been taken to ensure the security of said materials before, during, and after the election, except when said materials are properly in the possession of the Elections Department staff appointed to conduct the Miami Beach General Election. See the Certification of Logic and Accuracy attached and incorporated hereto.
- h. Rafael E, Granado, City Clerk, authorized the Miami-Dade Elections Department to scan ballots in preparation for the Post-Election Audit. City Clerk Granado authorized the Miami-Dade Elections Department to take all steps necessary to prepare for conducting a post-election, automated, independent audit of the voting systems, in accordance with Florida Statute 101.591 and applicable rules provided by the Florida Department of State. See Authorization to Scan Ballots in Preparation for the Post-Election Audit attached and incorporated hereto. (See also Item 3 below for additional information.)

2. Vote-by-Mail Information:

As of October 16, 2023, the Miami-Dade Elections Department delivered/mailed 1,456 Vote-by-Mail Ballots.

As of October 16, 2023, 193 Vote-by-Mail Ballots have been returned to the Miami-Dade County Elections Department, of which 8 had been returned with errors.

See Absentee Totals Report dated October 16, 2023.

3. Presentation by Christina White, Supervisor of Elections, and Michael Johnson, Deputy Supervisor of Elections (Information Systems), regarding the usage by the Miami-Dade County Elections Department of Clear Ballot election technology for Post-Election Audits.

In 2013, Florida became the first state to pass a statute giving counties the option of conducting post-election audits, either manually or through an automated independent method. See Florida Statute 101.591 – Voting System Audit. Florida Department of State Rule 1S-5.026 provides further clarification on processes related to the use of an automated audit in place of a manual audit. Clear Ballot's election technology is currently used in six states: Colorado, Florida, Maryland, New Hampshire, South Carolina, and Vermont. Clear Ballot became the first system authorized for use under the new statute and has been adopted by 35 Florida counties.

MANUAL AUDIT VERSUS AUTOMATED INDEPENDENT AUDIT

A manual audit consists of a public manual tally of the votes cast in one randomly selected race. The audit shall include all ballots in at least 1% but no more than 2% of the precincts chosen at random. An automated independent audit (AIA) consists of a public automated tally of the votes cast across every race that appears on the ballot. The automated independent audit must be at least 20% of the precincts chosen randomly.

AIA TESTING INCLUDED IN THE LOGIC AND ACCURACY TESTS

Scanner test: The supervisor must test each scanner as prescribed by the AIA vendor to ensure the scanner is operating properly.

Software test: Before scanning ballots in any election, the supervisor of elections must test the tabulation accuracy of the AIA software by performing a logic and accuracy test on all scanners used for scanning ballots.

TWO TYPES OF UNREADABLE BALLOTS

Per the requirements of Rule 1S-5.026, there are two types of unreadable ballots: 1) Confirm Only and 2) Leave in in "Occluded".

Confirm Only

- Upon approval by the Canvassing Board, election staff will confirm the selection as made by the automated system.
- No interpretations are made by staff.
- Only confirming selections made by the system.

Leave in "Occluded"

If variances warrant, the Canvassing Board will review these ballots.

AUDIT RESULTS COMPILATION

- Conducted after the official Certification of Results.
- Once all ballots have been scanned and interpreted as needed, the AIA system shall compile and compare the results to the official vote totals for all races in precincts.

 The results shall be produced as a summary report listing the official vote totals and vote discrepancies computed, if any, at the precinct level.

TWO POSSIBLE OUTCOMES

Outcome 1 - Audit Results show variances of less than ½ of 1%

- If the automated tally and official vote totals show no discrepancies or a discrepancy in every contest of less than ½ of 1%, the Canvassing Board shall list this result on the "Voting System Post- Election Audit Report" (DS-DE 107).
- Within 15 days after completion of the audit, the Canvassing Board must provide a report of the audit results to the Department of State.

Outcome 2 - Audit Results show variances of ½ of 1% or more

- The Canvassing Board must investigate by reviewing the ballot images or extracts therefrom to ascertain if the vote was marked in a race that was likely not read by the voting system tabulator or AIA system.
- The Canvassing Board must prepare a Discrepancy Report for Automated Independent Audit, DS-DE 106A, or the AIA system may print a report with the same required information.
- The Canvassing Board must explain the discrepancy in the Voting System Post-Election Audit Report, DS-DE 107.
- Within 15 days after completion of the audit, the Canvassing Board must provide a report of the audit results to the Department of State. The report must be accompanied by the summary report as specified in Rule 1S-5.026, or a Discrepancy Report for Automated Independent Audit (DS-DE 106A).

CLOSING

- The Clear Ballot system is designed to provide a more thorough audit.
- As a reminder, Rule 1S-5.026 allows a variance of less than half of 1%, or 0.005, and provides the Department of Election with authorization to proceed with preparation for the audit, as previously described.
- Since this is a Canvassing Board activity, activities associated with the automated independent audit system (AIA) are open to the public.

Reference Material:

Miami-Dade County Post Election Audit Handout provided by the Department of Elections

Name Badges – Florida Statute 102.141(9) requires that each member, substitute member, and alternate member of the Canvassing Board and all clerical help must wear identification badges during any period in which the Canvassing Board is canvassing votes or engaging in other official duties. The identification badges should be worn in a conspicuous and unobstructed area and include the name of the individual and their official position. Rafael E. Granado wore his identification badge while engaging in his official duties.

F:\CLER\CLER\000_ELECTION\00000 2023 GENERAL ELECTION\CANVASSING BOARD MEMBERSHIP, SCHEDULE, AGENDAS AND AFTER-ACTIONS\AGENDAS AND AFTER ACTIONS\02 Canvassing Board AFTER ACTION LOGIC AND ACCURACY TEST REG FINAL.docx



Elections 2700 NW 87th Avenue Miami, Florida 33172 T 305-499-8683 F 305-499-8547 TTY: 305-499-8480

ELECTION:

Miami Beach General Election

DATE OF ELECTION:

November 7, 2023

CERTIFICATION OF LOGIC AND ACCURACY

I, the undersigned, do by my signature hereto, certify that to the best of my knowledge:

- On, October 16, 2023, commencing at approximately 10:00 a.m., the Miami-Dade County Supervisor of Elections representative had the tabulating equipment tested to ascertain that the equipment will correctly count the precinct and absentee ballots cast for the candidates and/or issues, to be voted in the Miami Beach General Election to be held on November 7, 2023.
- 2. The undersigned compared the test results with the predetermined totals for each candidate and/or issue and pursuant to the requirements established in Section 101.5612, Florida Statutes, observed the performance and results of all required tests and verified the correctness of the programs and equipment, as well as any replacement of said materials required by said tests, subject to said tests.
- 3. At the completion of the above test, there were delivered to me, in a sealed container with Seal No. <u>0052763</u> the verified Logic and Accuracy reports [] and test materials [], and steps have been taken to ensure the security of said materials prior to, during and subsequent to the election, except when said materials are properly in the possession of the Elections Department staff appointed to conduct the election.

CANVASSING BOARD:

Rafael E. Granado, City Clerk



MUNICIPAL ELECTION

AUTHORIZATION TO SCAN BALLOTS IN PREPARATION FOR THE POST ELECTION AUDIT

The Miami Beach Municipal Clerk and/or Canvassing Board Member(s) hereby allow(s) the Miami-Dade Elections Department to:

Take all steps necessary to prepare for conducting a post-election, automated, independent audit of the voting systems, in accordance with Fla. Stat. 101.591 and applicable rules provided by the Florida Department of State.

Signature of Municipal Clerk and/or Canvassing Board Member(s):

| Rapa = Cranage | Convase | Co

Christina White Supervisor of Elections

Date 16-Oct-2023

Time 07:28 AM

Absentee Totals

859	Miami	Beach	General	Election

07-Nov-2023

General Election

Start Date 15-Sep-2023 12:00 am
End Date 16-Oct-2023 7:28 am

Ballot Style ALL							
1122	Military			Civil	ian		
Opening Totals	omestic	Absent Dom	Overseas	Domestic	Overseas	Total	
Absentee Requests —							
Voters requesting absentee ballots	5	2	0	1,461	15	1,483	
Canceled and Ineligible absentee requests	0	0	0	(26)	(1)	(27)	
Adjusted total of absentee requests	5	2	0	1,435	14	1,456	
Ballots Delivered/Mailed							
Absentee requests sent first absentee ballot	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Replacement absentee ballots issued	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Ballots issued to requests that were canceled Total absentee ballots issued to valid requests	0 0	0 0	0 0	(16) (16)	0 0	(16) (16)	
Ballots Returned							
Absentee ballots returned	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Absentee ballots returned with voter errors	0	0	Ö	0	0	0	
Total absentee ballots to be tabulated	0	0	0	0	0	0	
This Period's Activity							
Voters requesting absentee ballots	8	11	0	6,897	65	6,981	
Canceled and Ineligible absentee requests	0	0	0	(3)	0	(3)	
Absentee requests sent first absentee ballot	13	13	0	8,306	79	8,411	
Replacement absentee ballots issued	0	0	0	20 0	1 0	21 0	
Ballots issued to requests that were canceled in period	Ü	Ü	U	Ü	Ü	Ü	
Ballots Returned							
Absentee ballots returned	0	0	0	193	0	193	
Absentee ballots returned with voter errors	0	0	0	(8)	0	(8)	
Ballots returned in this period reinstated by Cnvssg Brd	0	0	0 0	0	0	0 185	
Net increase in ballots to be tabulated	0	U	Ü	185	U	105	
Closing Totals							
Absentee Requests							
Voters requesting absentee ballots	13	13	0	8,358	80	8,464	
Canceled and Ineligible absentee requests	0	0	0	(29)	(1)	(30)	
Adjusted total of absentee requests	13	13	0	8,329	79	8,434	
Ballots Delivered/Mailed					Season.		
Absentee requests sent first absentee ballot	13	13	0	8,306	79	8,411	
Replacement absentee ballots issued Ballots issued to requests that were canceled	0		0	20 (16)	1	21 (16)	
Total absentee ballots issued to valid requests	13		0	8,310	80	8,416	
Ballots Returned							
Absentee ballots returned	0	0	0	193	0	193	
Absentee ballots returned with voter errors	0	0	0	(8)	0	(8)	
Total absentee ballots to be tabulated	0	0	0	185	0	185	





LEGAL AUTHORITY

101.591 Voting system audit

- (1) Immediately following the certification of each election, the county canvassing board or the local board responsible for certifying the election shall conduct a manual audit or an automated, independent audit of the voting systems used in randomly selected precincts.
- (2)(a) A manual audit shall consist of a public manual tally of the votes cast in one randomly selected race that appears on the ballot. The tally sheet shall include election-day, vote-by-mail, early voting, provisional, and overseas ballots, in at least 1 percent but no more than 2 percent of the precincts chosen at random by the county canvassing board or the local board responsible for certifying the election. If 1 percent of the precincts is less than one entire precinct, the audit shall be conducted using at least one precinct chosen at random by the county canvassing board or the local board responsible for certifying the election. Such precincts shall be selected at a publicly noticed canvassing board meeting.
- An automated audit shall consist of a public automated tally of the votes cast across every race that appears on the bailot. The tally sheet shall include election day, vote-by-mail, early voting, provisional, and overseas ballots in at least 20 percent of the precincts chosen at random by the county canvassing board or the local board responsible for certifying the election. Such precincts shall be selected at a publicly noticed canvassing board meeting.
- (c) The division shall adopt rules for approval of an independent audit system which provide that the system, at a minimum, must be:
- 1. Completely independent of the primary voting system.
- Fast enough to produce final audit results within the timeframe prescribed in subsection (4).
- Capable of demonstrating that the ballots of record have been accurately adjudicated by the audit system.
- (3) The canvassing board shall post a notice of the audit, including the date, time, and place, in four conspicuous places in the county and on the home page of the county supervisor of elections website.
- (4) The audit must be completed and the results made public no later than 11:59 p.m. on the 7th day following certification of the election by the county canvassing board or the local board responsible for certifying the election.
- (5) Within 15 days after completion of the audit, the county canvassing board or the board responsible for certifying the election shall provide a report with the results of the audit to the Department of State in a standard format as prescribed by the department. The report shall contain, but is not limited to, the following items:
- (a) The overall accuracy of audit.
- (b) A description of any problems or discrepancies encountered.
- (c) The likely cause of such problems or discrepancies.
- (d) Recommended corrective action with respect to avoiding or mitigating such circumstances in future elections.
- (6) If a manual recount is undertaken pursuant to s. 102.166, the canvassing board is not required to perform the audit provided for in this section.

➤ In 2013, Florida became the first state to pass a statute giving counties the option of conducting post-election audits, either manually or through an automated independent method.



FLORIDA ADMINISTRATIVE CODE

Procedures Manual for Post-Election Certification Voting System Audits

Rule 1S-5.026 provides further clarification on processes related to the use of an automated audit in lieu of a manual audit.




DS-DE 410 (eff 06-22)

R1S - 5.026, Fla. Admin. Code



SYSTEM USAGE

- Clear Ballot's election technology is currently used in six states—Colorado, Florida, Maryland, New Hampshire, South Carolina, and Vermont.
- Clear Ballot became the first system authorized for use under the new statute and has been adopted by 35 counties.





MANUAL AUDIT VERSUS AUTOMATED INDEPENDENT AUDIT

- Manual audit consists of a public manual tally of the votes cast in one randomly selected race. The audit shall include all ballots in at least 1% but no more than 2% of the precincts chosen at random.
- An automated independent audit (AIA) consists of a public automated tally of the votes cast across **every** race that appears on the ballot. The automated independent audit must be at least 20% of the precincts chosen at random.

Disclaimer: This is an audit that is performed after results are officially certified.



AIA TESTING INCLUDED IN THE L&A


- Scanner test: The supervisor must test each scanner as prescribed by the AIA vendor to ensure the scanner is operating properly.
- Software test: Before scanning ballots in any election, the supervisor of elections must test the tabulation accuracy of the AIA software by performing a logic and accuracy test (L&A) on all scanners used for scanning ballots.



BALLOT SCANNING

Tabulating Equipment






DS850

Vote-By-Mail Ballots

DS200

Early Voting & Election Day Ballots

Auditing Equipment



Clear Ballot

Scanning Ballots



TWO TYPES OF UNREADABLE BALLOTS

Per the requirements of Rule 1S-5.026...

Confirm Only


- ➤ Upon approval by the Canvassing Board, election staff will confirm the selection as made by the automated system.
- ➤ No interpretations made by staff.
- ➤Only confirming selections made by the system.

Leave in "Occluded"

➤ If variances warrant, the Canvassing Board will review these ballots.





UNREADABLE – CONFIRM ONLY






UNREADABLE - CONFIRM ONLY








UNREADABLE – CONFIRM ONLY








UNREADABLE - CONFIRM ONLY









BALLOTS REMAINING IN OCCLUDED









BALLOTS REMAINING IN OCCLUDED








BALLOTS REMAINING IN OCCLUDED



BALLOTS REMAINING IN OCCLUDED







AUDIT RESULTS COMPILATION

- Conducted after the official Certification of Results.
- ➤Once all ballots have been scanned and interpreted—as needed—the AIA system shall compile and compare the results to the official vote totals for all races in precincts.
- The results shall be produced as a summary report listing the official vote totals and vote discrepancies computed, if any, at the precinct level.



STAFF-GENERATED COMPARISON OF VOTES CAST

	Tabulation System	Ballots Audit System With Contest		Tabulation System	m	
Choice	Comparison System	This System	Difference	Comparison System	This System	Difference
Homestead Mayor (Vote	e for 1)		ecens (o preparativo maio interior micro escina escena (micro en Premi escencia micro de la desensión de la companya de la com	новестрен, е в нуболен невое (упесаблители уначингалисталисталисталисталисталисталисталист	payininine control payari reprinterinte in our ficulture describilistes.	e palaket guire by ne adul territe este infres part e varie eau anna
Steve Losner	3,164	3.164	0	1899	1899	0
Julio Guzman	3,164	3,164	0	1114	1114	0
Sonia Castro Natal	3,164	3,164	0	134	135	+1
Homestead Council Mer	mber - Seat 6 (Vote for 1)	роших пофарын «Ду шиних на подред на держината инсползаце «од нада на франфор инфракцион до произволят на не одного положения в подред на держина в подред на держина в подред на одного положения в подред на одного положения в подред на одного положения в подред на одного под	оторную йнун нанаской ком Леварий причения в 17 кінер не пархичесь чествення на настоя в пархичесь чествення н		gazzmy po eth y kinn r Christoplandi is cingh din shique dhelangin anapi san pi a	ered historicage in opportune province a conference or con
Toshiba Mitchell	3,164	3,164	0	1190	1190	0
Clemente Canabal	3.164	3,164	0	803	803	0
Brandy Ramirez	3,164	3,164	0	758	758	0
Carlos Galvan	3,164	3,164	0	335	335	0



POST-ELECTION AUDIT COMPARISON REPORT




Post-Election Audit Comparison Report

Homestead Primary Election - October 3,2023

Contest	Contest	Choice	Choice	Drecinct	Counter	VS Paper	Audit	Card	Audit	Audit	Audit	VS Paper	Vote	Over	Blank
Name	ID	ID	Name	Name	Group	Cards	Paper Cards	Discrepancy	Automatic Votes	Canvassing Votes	Paper Votes		Discrepancy		11 11 11

(Any discrepancies were fewer than 0.5% of the total votes for each contest, and therefore not reported. This report is empty.)





TWO POSSIBLE OUTCOMES

OUTCOME 1

Audit Results show variances of < ½ of 1%

- ➤ If the automated tally and official vote totals show no discrepancies or a discrepancy in every contest of less than 1/2 of 1%, the Board shall list this result on the "Voting System Post-Election Audit Report" (DS-DE 107).
- Within 15 days after completion of the audit, the Board must provide a report of the audit results to the Department of State.

Voting System Post-Election Audit Report

	nty:		
• •	e of Audit (check applicable	hoppand	Automated Independent
Prec	einct Number(s):		
Race	e (if Manual Audit):		
1.	Cverall accuracy of the au	odit:	
2.	Description of any problem	me or discrepancies enco	untered:
2.	Lescription of any problem	nis or discrepancies enco	unicica.
3.	Likely cause of such prob	lems or discrepancies:	
4.	Fecommended corrective		oiding or mitigating such
Chec	ck applicable box and sign i	below:	
	We hereby certify that the represent and that attached are pre-		audit performed for the election is
	10 10	ng system audit was not o	done because a manual recount was
Signa	atures of County Canvassing	Board members:	
Print	ed Name	Signature	Date
Print	ed Name	Signature	Date
Print	ed Name	Signature	Date



OUTCOME 2

Audit Results show variances of ½ of 1% or more

- ➤ The Board must investigate by reviewing the ballot images or extracts there from to ascertain if the vote was marked in a race that was likely not read by the voting system tabulator or AIA system.
- Must prepare a Discrepancy Report for Automated Independent Audit, DS-DE 106A, or the AIA system may print a report with the same required information.
- Must explain the discrepancy on the Voting System Post-Election Audit Report, DS-DE 107.
- ➤ Within 15 days after completion of the audit, the Board must provide a report of the audit results to the Department of State.
- ➤ The report must be accompanied by the summary report as specified in Rule 1S-5.026, or a Discrepancy Report for Automated Independent Audit (DS-DE 106A).

Florida 106A Audit Report

Discrepancy Report for Automated Independent Audit

(NOTE: This report is required only when the automated tally and official totals show a discrepancy in any contest of ½ of 1% or more of the votes being audited.)

County:	Precinct:
Ballot type:	
Race:	

Candidate or Issue	Audit System Adjudicated Votes	Audit Indeterminate Votes	Canvassing Board Adjustments	Audit Total Votes 1+2=2	Certified Results Total	Difference = 9-6 (+ or -)
antido casing he also resimple secretar gaing the self-undisease group setting.						

						-
						
Number of overvotes			***************************************		*****	PEARSES
Number of undervotes						

Note: See definitions of terms on next page. Next page is not to be submitted with this page.

Rule 1S-5.026, F.A.C.

DS-DE 106A (eff. 01/2014)



CLOSING

- > The system is designed to provide a more thorough audit.
- > As a reminder, Rule **1S-5.026** allows a variance of less than half of 1%, or 0.005.
- Provide us with authorization to proceed with preparation for the audit, as previously described.
- Since this is a Canvassing Board activity, activities associated with this are open to the public.



QUESTIONS?